Search in power-law networks. Physical Review E, 64:046135, 2001. by James Abello et al.
Bibliography
[1] James Abello, Adam L. Buchsbaum, and Je ery Westbrook. A functional approach
to external graph algorithms. In Proc. 6th European Symposium on Algorithms, pages
332–343, 1998.
[2] Daron Acemoglu, Munther A. Dahleh, Ilan Lobel, and Asuman Ozdaglar. Bayesian
learning in social networks. Technical Report 2780, MIT Laboratory for Information
and Decision Systems (LIDS), May 2008.
[3] Theodore B. Achacoso and William S. Yamamoto. AY’s Neuroanatomy of C. Elegans
for Computation. CRC Press, 1991.
[4] Lada Adamic. Zipf, power-laws, and Pareto: A ranking tutorial, 2000. On-line at
http://www.hpl.hp.com/research/idl/papers/ranking/ranking.html.
[5] Lada Adamic and Natalie Glance. The political blogosphere and the 2004 U.S. election:
Divided they blog. In Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Link Discovery,
pages 36–43, 2005.
[6] Lada A. Adamic and Eytan Adar. How to search a social network. Social Networks,
27(3):187–203, 2005.
[7] Lada A. Adamic, Rajan M. Lukose, Amit R. Puniyani, and Bernardo A. Huberman.
Search in power-law networks. Physical Review E, 64:046135, 2001.
[8] Ravindra K. Ahuja, Thomas L. Magnanti, and James B. Orlin. Network Flows: Theory,
Algorithms, and Applications. Prentice Hall, 1993.
[9] George Akerlof. The market for ’lemons’: Quality uncertainty and the market mecha-
nism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84:488–500, 1970.
[10] R´ eka Albert and Albert-L´ aszl´ o Barab´ asi. Statistical mechanics of complex networks.
Reviews of Modern Physics, 74:47–97, 2002.
[11] Armen A. Alchian. Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory. Journal of Political
Economy, 58:211–221, 1950.
789790 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[12] Paul Anand. Foundations of Rational Choice Under Risk. Oxford University Press,
1993.
[13] Chris Anderson. The long tail. Wired, October 2004.
[14] Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt. Classroom games: Information cascades. Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 10(4):187–193, Fall 1996.
[15] Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt. Information cascades in the laboratory. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 87(5):847–862, December 1997.
[16] McKenzie Andre, Kashef Ijaz, Jon D. Tillinghast, Valdis E. Krebs, Lois A. Diem, Bev-
erly Metchock, Theresa Crisp, and Peter D. McElroy. Transmission network analysis
to complement routine tuberculosis contact investigations. American Journal of Public
Health, 97(3):470–477, 2007.
[17] Helmut K. Anheier, J¨ urgen Gerhards, and Frank P. Romo. Forms of capital and
social structure in cultural ﬁelds: Examining Bourdieu’s social topography. American
Journal of Sociology, 100(4):859–903, January 1995.
[18] Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, Jon M. Kleinberg, ´ Eva Tardos, Tom Wexler,
and Tim Roughgarden. The price of stability for network design with fair cost allo-
cation. In Proc. 45th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages
295–304, 2004.
[19] Elliot Anshelevich, Anirban Dasgupta, ´ Eva Tardos, and Tom Wexler. Near-optimal
network design with selﬁsh agents. In Proc. 35th ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing, pages 511–520, 2003.
[20] Tibor Antal, Paul Krapivsky, and Sidney Redner. Social balance on networks: The
dynamics of friendship and enmity. Physica D, 224(130), 2006.
[21] Sinan Aral, Lev Muchnik, and Arun Sundararajan. Distinguishing inﬂuence-based
contagion from homophily-driven di usion in dynamic networks. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. USA, 106(51):21544–21549, December 2009.
[22] Kenneth J. Arrow. A di culty in the concept of social welfare. Journal of Political
Economy, 58(4):328–346, August 1950.
[23] Kenneth J. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. John Wiley & Sons, second
edition, 1963.
[24] Kenneth J. Arrow. The role of securities in the optimal allocation of risk-bearing.
Review of Economic Studies, 31(2):91–96, April 1964.BIBLIOGRAPHY 791
[25] Brian Arthur. Positive feedbacks in the economy. Scientiﬁc American, pages 92–99,
February 1990.
[26] W. Brian Arthur. Inductive reasoning and bounded rationality. American Economic
Review, 84:406–411, 1994.
[27] W. Brian Arthur. Increasing returns and the two worlds of business. Harvard Business
Review, 74(4):100–109, July–August 1996.
[28] Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenberger. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium.
Econometrica, 63(5):1161–1180, 1995.
[29] Robert J. Aumann. Agreeing to disagree. Annals of Statistics, 4:1236–1239, 1976.
[30] David Austen-Smith and Je rey S. Banks. Information aggregation, rationality, and
the Condorcet Jury Theorem. American Political Science Review, 90(1):34–45, March
1996.
[31] Yossi Azar, Benjamin Birnbaum, L. Elisa Celis, Nikhil R. Devanur, and Yuval Peres.
Convergence of local dynamics to balanced outcomes in exchange networks. In Proc.
50th IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2009.
[32] Lars Backstrom, Dan Huttenlocher, Jon Kleinberg, and Xiangyang Lan. Group for-
mation in large social networks: Membership, growth, and evolution. In Proc. 12th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
2006.
[33] Lars Backstrom, Eric Sun, and Cameron Marlow. Find me if you can: Improving
geographical prediction with social and spatial proximity. In Proc. 19th International
World Wide Web Conference, 2010.
[34] David A. Bader, Shiva Kintali, Kamesh Madduri, and Milena Mihail. Approximating
betweenness centrality. In Proc. 5th Workshop on Algorithms and Models for the Web
Graph, pages 124–137, 2007.
[35] David A. Bader and Kamesh Madduri. SNAP: Small-world network analysis and
partitioning: An open-source parallel graph framework for the exploration of large-scale
networks. In Proc. 22nd IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed
Processing, pages 1–12, 2008.
[36] Ricardo Baeza-Yates and Berthier Ribeiro-Neto. Modern Information Retrieval. Ad-
dison Wesley, 1999.792 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[37] Linda Baker. Removing roads and tra c lights speeds urban travel. Scientiﬁc Amer-
ican, pages 20–21, February 2009.
[38] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal. Learning from neighbours. Review of Economic
Studies, 65(3):595–621, 1998.
[39] Venkatesh Bala and Sanjeev Goyal. A non-cooperative model of network formation.
Econometrica, 68:1181–1229, September 2000.
[40] Abhijit Banerjee. A simple model of herd behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
107:797–817, 1992.
[41] Maya Bar-Hillel and Avishai Margalit. How vicious are cycles of intransitive choice?
Theory and Decision, 24:119–145, 1988.
[42] Albert-L´ aszl´ o Barab´ asi and R´ eka Albert. Emergence of scaling in random networks.
Science, 286:509–512, 1999.
[43] Albert-L´ aszl´ o Barab´ asi and Zoltan Oltvai. Network biology: Understanding the cell’s
functional organization. Nature Reviews Genetics, 5:101–113, 2004.
[44] A. D. Barbour and D. Mollison. Epidemics and random graphs. In Stochastic Processes
in Epidemic Theory, volume 86 of Lecture Notes in Biomathematics, pages 86–89.
Springer, 1990.
[45] John A. Barnes. Social Networks. Number 26 in Modules in Anthropology. Addison
Wesley, 1972.
[46] Chris Barrett and E. Mutambatsere. Agricultural markets in developing countries. In
Lawrence E. Blume and Steven N. Durlauf, editors, The New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics. Oxford University Press, second edition, 2008.
[47] Alex Bavelas. Communication patterns in task-oriented groups. Journal of the Acous-
tical Society of America, 22(6):725–730, November 1950.
[48] Peter Bearman and James Moody. Suicide and friendships among American adoles-
cents. American Journal of Public Health, 94(1):89–95, 2004.
[49] Peter Bearman, James Moody, and Katherine Stovel. Chains of a ection: The struc-
ture of adolescent romantic and sexual networks. American Journal of Sociology,
110(1):44–99, 2004.
[50] Morton L. Bech and Enghin Atalay. The topology of the federal funds market. Tech-
nical Report 354, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, November 2008.BIBLIOGRAPHY 793
[51] Joyce E. Berg, Forrest D. Nelson, and Thomas A. Rietz. Prediction market accuracy
in the long run. International Journal of Forecasting, 24(2):285–300, April–June 2008.
[52] Noam Berger, Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, and Amin Saberi. On the spread of
viruses on the Internet. In Proc. 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms,
pages 301–310, 2005.
[53] Kenneth Berman. Vulnerability of scheduled networks and a generalization of Menger’s
theorem. Networks, 28:125–134, 1996.
[54] Tim Berners-Lee, Robert Cailliau, Ari Luotonen, Henrik Frystyk Nielsen, and Arthur
Secret. The World-Wide Web. Communications of the ACM, 37(8):76–82, 1994.
[55] Tim Berners-Lee and Mark Fischetti. Weaving the Web. Harper Collins, 1999.
[56] Krishna Bharat, Bay-Wei Chang, Monika Rauch Henzinger, and Matthias Ruhl. Who
links to whom: Mining linkage between Web sites. In Proc. IEEE International Con-
ference on Data Mining, pages 51–58, 2001.
[57] Krishna Bharat and Monika Rauch Henzinger. Improved algorithms for topic distilla-
tion in a hyperlinked environment. In Proc. 21st ACM SIGIR Conference on Research
and Development in Information Retrieval, pages 104–111, 1998.
[58] Krishna Bharat and George A. Mihaila. When experts agree: Using non-a liated ex-
perts to rank popular topics. In Proc. 10th International World Wide Web Conference,
pages 597–602, 2001.
[59] Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. A theory of fads, fashion,
custom and cultural change as information cascades. Journal of Political Economy,
100:992–1026, 1992.
[60] Ken Binmore, Ariel Rubinstein, and Asher Wolinsky. The Nash bargaining solution in
economic modeling. RAND Journal of Economics, 17:176–188, 1986.
[61] Duncan Black. On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 56:23–34, 1948.
[62] Larry Blume. The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction. Games and Economic
Behavior, 5:387–424, 1993.
[63] Larry Blume, David Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, and ´ Eva Tardos. Trading networks
with price-setting agents. In Proc. 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
pages 143–151, 2007.794 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[64] Lawrence Blume and David Easley. Evolution and market behavior. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 58:9–40, 1992.
[65] Lawrence Blume and David Easley. If you’re so smart, why aren’t you rich? Belief
selection in complete and incomplete markets. Econometrica, 74:929–966, 2006.
[66] Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine. Against Intellectual Monopoly. Cambridge
University Press, 2008.
[67] Bela Bollob´ as and Fan R. K. Chung. The diameter of a cycle plus a random matching.
SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics, 1(3):328–333, August 1988.
[68] Bela Bollob´ as and Oliver Riordan. Mathematical results on scale-free random graphs.
In Stefan Bornholdt and Hans Georg Schuster, editors, Handbook of Graphs and Net-
works, pages 1–34. John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
[69] Bela Bollob´ as and Oliver Riordan. Percolation. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[70] Abraham Bookstein. Informetric distributions, Part II: Resilience to ambiguity. Jour-
nal of the American Society for Information Science, 41(5):376–386, 1990.
[71] Stephen P. Borgatti. Identifying sets of key players in a network. Computational and
Mathematical Organization Theory, 12(4):21–34, 2006.
[72] Stephen P. Borgatti and Martin G. Everett. Models of core/periphery structures.
Social Networks, 21(4):375–395, October 2000.
[73] Stephen P. Borgatti and Martin G. Everett. A graph-theoretic perspective on central-
ity. Social Networks, 28(4):466–484, 2006.
[74] Stephen P. Borgatti, Candace Jones, and Martin G. Everett. Network measures of
social capital. Connections, 21(2):27–36, 1998.
[75] Pierre Bourdieu. The forms of capital. In J. E. Richardson, editor, Handbook of Theory
of Research for the Sociology of Education, pages 241–258. Greenwood Press, 1986.
[76] Dietrich Braess. ¨ Uber ein paradoxon aus der verkehrsplanung. Un-
ternehmensforschung, 12:258–268, 1968.
[77] Ulrich Brandes. A faster algorithm for betweenness centrality. Journal of Mathematical
Sociology, 25:163–177, 2001.
[78] Ronald L. Breiger. The duality of persons and groups. Social Forces, 53:181–190, 1974.BIBLIOGRAPHY 795
[79] Sergey Brin and Lawrence Page. The anatomy of a large-scale hypertextual Web search
engine. In Proc. 7th International World Wide Web Conference, pages 107–117, 1998.
[80] Andrei Broder, Ravi Kumar, Farzin Maghoul, Prabhakar Raghavan, Sridhar Ra-
jagopalan, Raymie Stata, Andrew Tomkins, and Janet Wiener. Graph structure in
the Web. In Proc. 9th International World Wide Web Conference, pages 309–320,
2000.
[81] John M. Broder. From a theory to a consensus on emissions. New York Times, 16
May 2009.
[82] Chris Brown. Run/pass balance and a little game theory, 10 July
2006. http://smartfootball.blogspot.com/2006/07/runpass-balance-and-little-game-
theory.html.
[83] Luciana S. Buriol, Carlos Castillo, Debora Donato, Stefano Leonardi, and Stefano
Millozzi. Temporal analysis of the wikigraph. In Proc. IEEE/WIC/ACM International
Conference on Web Intelligence, pages 45–51, 2006.
[84] Brian Burke. Game theory and run/pass balance, 13 June 2008.
http://www.advancednﬂstats.com/2008/06/game-theory-and-runpass-balance.html.
[85] Ronald S. Burt. Social contagion and innovation: Cohesion versus structural equiva-
lence. American Journal of Sociology, 92(6):1287–1335, May 1987.
[86] Ronald S. Burt. Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition. Harvard
University Press, 1992.
[87] Ronald S. Burt. The network structure of social capital. Research in Organizational
Studies, 22:345–423, 2000.
[88] Ronald S. Burt. Structural holes and good ideas. American Journal of Sociology,
110(2):349–99, September 2004.
[89] Vannevar Bush. As we may think. Atlantic Monthly, 176(1):101–108, July 1945.
[90] Vincent Buskens and Arnout van de Rijt. Dynamics of networks if everyone strives for
structural holes. American Journal of Sociology, 114(2):371–407, 2009.
[91] Samuel R. Buss and Peter Clote. Solving the Fisher-Wright and coalescence problems
with a discrete Markov chain analysis. Advances in Applied Probability, 36:1175–1197,
2004.796 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[92] Robert B. Cairns and Beverly D. Cairns. Lifelines and Risks: Pathways of Youth in
our Time. Cambridge University Press, 1995.
[93] Colin Camerer. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction.
Princeton University Press, 2003.
[94] Rebecca L. Cann, Mark Stoneking, and Allan C. Wilson. Mitochondrial DNA and
human evolution. Nature, 325:31–36, January 1987.
[95] E. C. Capen, R. V. Clapp, and W. M. Campbell. Competitive bidding in high-risk
situations. Journal of Petroleum Technology, 23:641–653, June 1971.
[96] Jean M. Carlson and John Doyle. Highly optimized tolerance:a mechanism for power
laws in designed systems. Physical Review E, 60(2):1412–1427, 1999.
[97] Dorwin Cartwright and Frank Harary. Structure balance: A generalization of Heider’s
theory. Psychological Review, 63(5):277–293, September 1956.
[98] James Cassing and Richard W. Douglas. Implications of the auction mechanism in
baseball’s free agent draft. Southern Economic Journal, 47:110–121, July 1980.
[99] Stanislaw Cebrat, Jan P. Radomski, and Dietrich Stau er. Genetic paralog analysis
and simulations. In International Conference on Computational Science, pages 709–
717, 2004.
[100] Bogachan Celen and Shachar Kariv. Distinguishing informational cascades from herd
behavior in the laboratory. American Economic Review, 94(3):484–498, June 2004.
[101] Damon Centola and Michael Macy. Complex contagions and the weakness of long ties.
American Journal of Sociology, 113:702–734, 2007.
[102] Soumen Chakrabarti, Byron Dom, Prabhakar Raghavan, Sridhar Rajagopalan, David
Gibson, and Jon M. Kleinberg. Automatic resource compilation by analyzing hyperlink
structure and associated text. In Proc. 7th International World Wide Web Conference,
pages 65–74, 1998.
[103] Soumen Chakrabarti, Alan M. Frieze, and Juan Vera. The inﬂuence of search en-
gines on preferential attachment. In Proc. 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete
Algorithms, pages 293–300, 2005.
[104] Damien Challet, M. Marsili, and Gabriele Ottino. Shedding light on El Farol. Physica
A, 332:469–482, 2004.BIBLIOGRAPHY 797
[105] Murray Chass. View of sport: It’s over now that it’s over. New York Times, 1 October
1989.
[106] Eddie Cheng, Jerrold W. Grossman, and Marc J. Lipman. Time-stamped graphs and
their associated inﬂuence digraphs. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 128:317–335, 2003.
[107] P.A. Chiappori, S. Levitt, and T. Groseclose. Testing mixed-strategy equilibria when
players are heterogeneous: The case of penalty kicks in soccer. American Economic
Review, 92:1138–1151, 2002.
[108] Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler. The spread of obesity in a large social
network over 32 years. New England Journal of Medicine, 357(4):3700–379, July 2007.
[109] Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Structure and strategy in collective action. American
Journal of Sociology, 105(1):128–156, July 1999.
[110] Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Communication and coordination in social networks. Review
of Economic Studies, 67:1–16, 2000.
[111] Michael Suk-Young Chwe. Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common
Knowledge. Princeton University Press, 2001.
[112] Edward H. Clarke. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 11:17–33, Fall
1971.
[113] Ronald Coase. The problem of social cost. Journal of Law and Economics, 1:1–44,
1960.
[114] Jere M. Cohen. Sources of peer group homogeneity. Sociology in Education, 50:227–241,
October 1977.
[115] James Coleman, Herbert Menzel, and Elihu Katz. Medical Innovations: A Di usion
Study. Bobbs Merrill, 1966.
[116] James S. Coleman. The Adolescent Society. Free Press, 1961.
[117] James S. Coleman. Social capital in the creation of human capital. American Journal
of Sociology, 94(S1):S95–S120, 1988.
[118] James S. Coleman. Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press, 1990.
[119] Vittoria Colizza, Alain Barrat, Marc Barth´ elemy, and Alessandro Vespignani. The
role of the airline transportation network in the prediction and predictability of global
epidemics. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103(7):2015–2020, 2006.798 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[120] Karen S. Cook and Toshio Yamagishi. Power in exchange networks: A power-
dependence formulation. Social Networks, 14:245–265, 1992.
[121] Jacomo Corbo and David C. Parkes. The price of selﬁsh behavior in bilateral network
formation. In Proc. 24th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing,
pages 99–107, 2005.
[122] David Crandall, Dan Cosley, Dan Huttenlocher, Jon Kleinberg, and Siddharth Suri.
Feedback e ects between similarity and social inﬂuence in online communities. In
Proc. 14th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining, 2008.
[123] Vincent P. Crawford. Lying for strategic advantage: Rational and boundedly rational
misrepresentation of intentions. American Economic Review, 93(1):133–149, 2003.
[124] Partha Dasgupta, Peter Hammond, and Eric Maskin. The implementation of social
choice rules: Some general results on incentive compatibility. Review of Economic
Studies, 46, 1979—216.
[125] Ian Davis. Talis, Web 2.0, and all that, 4 July 2005. Internet Alchemy blog,
http://internetalchemy.org/2005/07/talis-web-20-and-all-that.
[126] James A. Davis. Structural balance, mechanical solidarity, and interpersonal relations.
American Journal of Sociology, 68:444–462, 1963.
[127] James A. Davis. Clustering and structural balance in graphs. Human Relations,
20(2):181–187, 1967.
[128] Gabrielle Demange. Strategyproofness in the assignment market game, 1982. Labora-
tiore d’Econometrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique.
[129] Gabrielle Demange, David Gale, and Marilda Sotomayor. Multi-item auctions. Journal
of Political Economy, 94(4):863–872, 1986.
[130] Jared Diamond. Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. W. W.
Norton & Company, 1999.
[131] Peter Dodds, Roby Muhamad, and Duncan Watts. An experimental study of search
in global social networks. Science, 301:827–829, 2003.
[132] Pedro Domingos and Matt Richardson. Mining the network value of customers. In
Proc. 7th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data
Mining, pages 57–66, 2001.BIBLIOGRAPHY 799
[133] Debora Donato, Luigi Laura, Stefano Leonardi, and Stefano Millozzi. The Web as a
graph: How far we are. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology, 7(1), 2007.
[134] Shawn M. Douglas, Gaetano T. Montelione, and Mark Gerstein. PubNet: a ﬂexible
system for visualizing literature derived networks. Genome Biology, 6(9), 2005.
[135] Zvi Drezner (editor). Facility location: a survey of applications and methods. Springer,
1995.
[136] Raissa M. D’Souza, Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Noam Berger, and Robert D.
Kleinberg. Emergence of tempered preferential attachment from optimization. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 104(15):6112–6117, April 2007.
[137] Jennifer A. Dunne. The network structure of food webs. In Mercedes Pascual and
Jennifer A. Dunne, editors, Ecological Networks: Linking Structure to Dynamics in
Food Webs, pages 27–86. Oxford University Press, 2006.
[138] Steven Durlauf and Marcel Fafchamps. Social capital. In Phillippe Agion and Steven
Durlauf, editors, Handbook of Economic Growth. Elsevier, 2004.
[139] Richard Durrett. Stochastic spatial models. SIAM Review, 41(4):677–718, 1999.
[140] Cynthia Dwork, Ravi Kumar, Moni Naor, and D. Sivakumar. Rank aggregation meth-
ods for the web. In Proc. 10th International World Wide Web Conference, pages
613–622, 2001.
[141] Nathan Eagle and Alex Pentland. Reality mining: Sensing complex social systems.
Personal and Ubiquitous Computing, 10(4), May 2006.
[142] Nathan Eagle, Alex Pentland, and David Lazer. Mobile phone data for inferring social
network structure. In John J. Salerno Huan Liu and Michael J. Young, editors, Social
Computing, Behavioral Modeling, and Prediction, pages 79–88. Springer, 2008.
[143] Nicholas Economides. Desirability of compatibility in the absence of network external-
ities. American Economic Review, 79(5):1165–1181, December 1989.
[144] Ben Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky, and Michael Schwarz. Internet advertising and
the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords.
American Economic Review, 97(1):242–259, March 2007.
[145] Leo Egghe and Ronald Rousseau. Introduction to Informetrics: Quantitative Methods
in Library, Documentation and Information Science. Elsevier, 1990.800 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[146] Anita Elberse. Should you invest in the long tail? Harvard Business Review,
86(7/8):88–96, Jul-Aug 2008.
[147] Glenn Ellison. Learning, local interaction, and coordination. Econometrica, 61:1047–
1071, 1993.
[148] Richard M. Emerson. Power-dependence relations. American Sociological Review,
27:31–40, 1962.
[149] Stephen Eubank, Hasan Guclu, V. S. Anil Kumar, Madhav V. Marathe, Aravind
Srinivasan, Zoltan Toroczkai, and Nan Wang. Modelling disease outbreaks in realistic
urban social networks. Nature, 429:180–184, 2004.
[150] Eyal Even-Dar, Michael Kearns, and Siddharth Suri. A network formation game for
bipartite exchange economies. In Proc. 18th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Al-
gorithms, pages 697–706, 2007.
[151] Alex Fabrikant, Elias Koutsoupias, and Christos H. Papadimitriou. Heuristically op-
timized trade-o s: A new paradigm for power laws in the Internet. In Proc. 29th Intl.
Colloq. on Automata, Languages and Programming, pages 110–122, 2002.
[152] Alex Fabrikant, Ankur Luthra, Elitza N. Maneva, Christos H. Papadimitriou, and
Scott Shenker. On a network creation game. In Proc. 22nd ACM Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 347–351, 2003.
[153] Marcel Fafchamps and Eleni Gabre-Madhin. Agricultural markets in Benin and
Malawi. African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1(1):67–94, 2006.
[154] Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, and Moshe Y. Vardi. Reasoning
About Knowledge. MIT Press, 1995.
[155] Michalis Faloutsos, Petros Faloutsos, and Christos Faloutsos. On power-law relation-
ships of the Internet topology. In Proc. ACM SIGCOMM Conference on Applications,
Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for Computer Communication, pages 251–
262, 1999.
[156] Daniel S. Falster and Mark Westoby. Plant height and evolutionary games. Trends in
Ecology and Evolution, 18(7):337–343, July 2003.
[157] Eugene F. Fama. The behavior of stock market prices. Journal of Business, 38:34–105,
1965.
[158] Gerald R. Faulhaber. Network e ects and merger analysis: Instant messaging and the
AOL Time Warner case. Telecommunication Policy, 26:311–333, June/July 2002.BIBLIOGRAPHY 801
[159] Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. The swing voter’s curse. American
Economic Review, 86(3):408–424, June 1996.
[160] Timothy J. Feddersen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. Convicting the innocent: The infe-
riority of unanimous jury verdicts under strategic voting. American Political Science
Review, 92(1):23–35, March 1998.
[161] Scott L. Feld. The focused organization of social ties. American Journal of Sociology,
86(5):1015–1035, 1981.
[162] Claude S. Fischer. America calling: A social history of the telephone to 1940. University
of California Press, 1992.
[163] Peter C. Fishburn. Nontransitive preferences in decision theory. Journal of Risk and
Uncertainty, 4:113–134, 1991.
[164] Lester R. Ford and D. Ray Fulkerson. Flows in Networks. Princeton University Press,
1962.
[165] S. Fortunato, A. Flammini, F. Menczer, and A. Vespignani. Topical interests and the
mitigation of search engine bias. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103(34):12684–12689,
2006.
[166] James H. Fowler and Sangick Jeon. The authority of Supreme Court precedent. Social
Networks, 30:16–30, 2008.
[167] Reiner Franke. Reinforcement learning in the El Farol model. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 51:367–388, 2003.
[168] Linton C. Freeman. A set of measure of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry,
40(1):35–41, 1977.
[169] Linton C. Freeman. Centrality in social networks: Conceptual clariﬁcation. Social
Networks, 1:215–239, 1979.
[170] Noah Friedkin. A Structural Theory of Social Inﬂuence. Cambridge University Press,
1998.
[171] Eric Friedman, Paul Resnick, and Rahul Sami. Manipulation-resistant reputation
systems. In Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, ´ Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani, editors,
Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 677–698. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[172] Milton Friedman. Essays in Positive Economics. University of Chicago Press, 1953.802 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[173] H. L. Frisch and J. M. Hammersley. Percolation processes and related topics. SIAM
Journal on Applied Mathematics, 11(4):894–918, 1963.
[174] Yun-Xin Fu. Exact coalescent for the Wright-Fisher model. Theoretical Population
Biology, 69:385–394, 2006.
[175] Drew Fudenberg and David Levine. The Theory of Learning in Games. The MIT
Press, 1998.
[176] Douglas Gale and Shachar Kariv. Financial networks. American Economic Review:
Papers and Proceedings, 97(2):99–103, May 2007.
[177] Eugene Garﬁeld. Citation analysis as a tool in journal evaluation. Science, 178:471–
479, 1972.
[178] Eugene Garﬁeld. It’s a small world after all. Current Contents, 43:5–10, 1979.
[179] John Geanakoplos. Three brief proofs of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Economic
Theory, 26(1):211–215, 2005.
[180] Nancy Geller. On the citation inﬂuence methodology of Pinski and Narin. Information
Processing and Management, 14:93–95, 1978.
[181] Mordechai Gersani, Joel S. Brown, Erin E. O’Brien, Godfrey M. Maina, and Zvika
Abramski. Tragedy of the commons as a result of root competition. Journal of Ecology,
89:660–669, 2001.
[182] David Gibson. Concurrency and commitment: Network scheduling and its conse-
quences for di usion. Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 29(4):295–323, 2005.
[183] Michelle Girvan, Duncan Callaway, Mark E. J. Newman, and Steven H. Strogatz.
Simple model of epidemics with pathogen mutation. Physical Review E, 65:031915,
2002.
[184] Michelle Girvan and Mark E. J. Newman. Community structure in social and biological
networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 99(12):7821–7826, June 2002.
[185] Scott A. Golder, Dennis Wilkinson, and Bernardo A. Huberman. Rhythms of social
interaction: Messaging within a massive online network. In Proc. 3rd International
Conference on Communities and Technologies, 2007.
[186] Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson. Naive learning in social networks: Conver-
gence, inﬂuence and the wisdom of crowds. American Economic Journal: Microeco-
nomics, 2(1):112–149, 2010.BIBLIOGRAPHY 803
[187] Joshua Goodman, Gordon Cormack, and David Heckerman. Spam and the ongoing
battle for the inbox. Communications of the ACM, 50(2):24–33, February 2007.
[188] Sanjeev Goyal and Fernando Vega-Redondo. Structural holes in social networks. Jour-
nal of Economic Theory, to appear.
[189] Ronald L. Graham. On properties of a well-known graph, or, What is your Ramsey
number? Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 328(1):166–172, June 1979.
[190] Mark Granovetter. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78:1360–
1380, 1973.
[191] Mark Granovetter. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. University of
Chicago Press, 1974.
[192] Mark Granovetter. Threshold models of collective behavior. American Journal of
Sociology, 83:1420–1443, 1978.
[193] Mark Granovetter. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embedded-
ness. American Journal of Sociology, 91(3):481–510, November 1985.
[194] Mark Granovetter. Problems of explanation in economic sociology. In Nitin Nohria and
Robert G. Eccles, editors, Networks and Organization, pages 29–56. Harvard Business
School Press, 1992.
[195] Nicholas C. Grassly, Christophe Fraser, and Geo rey P. Garnett. Host immunity and
synchronized epidemics of syphilis across the United States. Nature, 433:417–421,
January 2005.
[196] B. T. Grenfell, O. N. Bjornstad, and J. Kappey. Travelling waves and spatial hierarchies
in measles epidemics. Nature, 414:716–723, December 2001.
[197] David Gri eath. Ultimate Bacon: The giant component of a complex network.
http://psoup.math.wisc.edu/archive/recipe59.html.
[198] Jerrold W. Grossman and Patrick D. F. Ion. On a portion of the well-known collabo-
ration graph. Congressus Numerantium, 108:129–131, 1995.
[199] Theodore Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617–631, July 1973.
[200] John Guare. Six Degrees of Separation: A Play. Vintage Books, 1990.
[201] R. V. Guha, Ravi Kumar, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Andrew Tomkins. Propagation
of trust and distrust. In Proc. 13th International World Wide Web Conference, 2004.804 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[202] Sunetra Gupta, Roy M. Anderson, and Robert M. May. Networks of sexual contacts:
Implications for the pattern of spread of HIV. AIDS, 3:807–817, 1989.
[203] Werner G¨ uth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze. An experimental analysis of
ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3:367–388,
1982.
[204] Frank Harary. On the notion of balance of a signed graph. Michigan Math. Journal,
2(2):143–146, 1953.
[205] Garrett Hardin. The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162(3859):1243–1248, 1968.
[206] Larry Harris. Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners. Oxford
University Press, 2002.
[207] Milt Harris and Robert Townsend. Resource allocation under asymmetric information.
Econometrica, 49:33–64, 1981.
[208] John C. Harsanyi. Game with incomplete information played by “Bayesian” players,
I–III. Part I: The basic model. Management Science, 14(3):159–182, November 1967.
[209] Joel Hasbrouck. Empirical Market Microstructure: The Institutions, Economics, and
Econometrics of Securities Trading. Oxford University Press, 2007.
[210] Kjetil K. Haugen. The performance-enhancing drug game. Journal of Sports Econom-
mics, 5(1):67–86, 2004.
[211] D. T. Haydon, M. Chase-Topping, D. J. Shaw, L. Matthews, J. K. Friar, J. Wilesmith,
and M. E. J. Woolhouse. The construction and analysis of epidemic trees with reference
to the 2001 UK foot-and-mouth outbreak. Proc. Royal Soc. London B, 270:121–127,
2003.
[212] Kais Hazma. The smallest uniform upper bound on the distance between the mean
and the median of the binomial and Poisson distributions. Statistics and Probability
Letters, 23:21–25, 1995.
[213] Daihai He and Lewi Stone. Spatio-temporal synchronization of recurrent epidemics.
Proc. Royal Soc. London B, 270:1519–1526, 2003.
[214] F. Heart, A. McKenzie, J. McQuillian, and D. Walden. ARPANET Completion Report.
Bolt, Beranek and Newman, 1978.
[215] Peter Hedstrom. Contagious collectivities: On the spatial di usion of Swedish trade
unions. American Journal of Sociology, 99:1157–1179, 1994.BIBLIOGRAPHY 805
[216] Fritz Heider. Attitudes and cognitive organization. Journal of Psychology, 21:107–112,
1946.
[217] Fritz Heider. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. John Wiley & Sons, 1958.
[218] Robert Heinsohn and Craig Packer. Complex cooperative strategies in group-territorial
African lions. Science, 269:1260–1262, September 1995.
[219] Miguel Helft. Google and Apple eliminate another tie. New York Times, 12 October
2009.
[220] James Hendler, Nigel Shadbolt, Wendy Hall, Tim Berners-Lee, and Daniel Weitzner.
Web science: An interdisciplinary approach to understanding the Web. Communica-
tions of the ACM, 51(7):60–69, 2008.
[221] Douglas Hofstadter. G¨ odel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Basic Books,
1979.
[222] Bernardo A. Huberman, Daniel M. Romero, and Fang Wu. Social networks that
matter: Twitter under the microscope. First Monday, 14(1), January 2009.
[223] Ste en Huck and Jorg Oechssler. Informational cascades in the laboratory: Do they
occur for the right reasons? Journal of Economic Psychology, 21(6):661–671, 2000.
[224] Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague. Networks in context: The social ﬂow of political
information. American Political Science Review, 81(4):1197–1216, December 1987.
[225] Nicole Immorlica, Jon Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, and Tom Wexler. The role
of compatibility in the di usion of technologies through social networks. In Proc. 8th
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007.
[226] Y. Iwasa, D. Cohen, and J. A. Leon. Tree height and crown shape, as results of
competitive games. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 112:279–298, 1985.
[227] Matthew O. Jackson and Asher Wolinsky. A strategic model of social and economic
networks. Journal of Economic Theory, 71(1):44–74, 1996.
[228] Thorsten Joachims. Optimizing search engines using clickthrough data. In Proc. 8th
ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining,
pages 133–142, 2002.
[229] Ramesh Johari and Sunil Kumar. Congestible services and network e ects. In Proc.
11th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2010.806 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[230] Steve Jurvetson. What exactly is viral marketing? Red Herring, 78:110–112, 2000.
[231] Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological
Review, 80(4):237–251, 1973.
[232] Sham M. Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, Luis E. Ortiz, Robin Pemantle, and Siddharth
Suri. Economic properties of social networks. In Proc. 17th Advances in Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems, 2004.
[233] Denise B. Kandel. Homophily, selection, and socialization in adolescent friendships.
American Journal of Sociology, 84(2):427–436, September 1978.
[234] Yakar Kannai. The core and balancedness. In Robert J. Aumman and Sergiu Hart,
editors, Handbook of Game Theory, volume 1, pages 355–395. Elsevier, 1992.
[235] Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro. Network externalities, competition, and compati-
bility. American Economic Review, 75(3):424–440, June 1985.
[236] Michael Kearns, Stephen Judd, Jinsong Tan, and Jennifer Wortman. Behavioral ex-
periments on biased voting in networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 106(5):1347–1352,
February 2009.
[237] Michael Kearns, Siddharth Suri, and Nick Montfort. An experimental study of the
coloring problem on human subject networks. Science, 313(5788):824–827, 2006.
[238] Matt J. Keeling and Ken T. D. Eames. Network and epidemic models. J. Royal Soc.
Interface, 2:295–307, 2005.
[239] David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and Amit Kumar. Connectivity and inference problems
for temporal networks. In Proc. 32nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages
504–513, 2000.
[240] David Kempe, Jon Kleinberg, and ´ Eva Tardos. Maximizing the spread of inﬂuence in
a social network. In Proc. 9th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery and Data Mining, pages 137–146, 2003.
[241] Je rey Kephart, Gregory Sorkin, David Chess, and Steve White. Fighting computer
viruses. Scientiﬁc American, pages 88–93, November 1997.
[242] Walter Kern and Dani¨ el Palusma. Matching games: The least core and the nucleolus.
Mathematics of Operations Research, 28(2):294–308, 2003.
[243] Peter D. Killworth and H. Russell Bernard. Reverse small world experiment. Social
Networks, 1:159–192, 1978.BIBLIOGRAPHY 807
[244] Peter D. Killworth, Eugene C. Johnsen, H. Russell Bernard, Gene Ann Shelley, and
Christopher McCarty. Estimating the size of personal networks. Social Networks,
12(4):289–312, December 1990.
[245] John F. C. Kingman. The coalescent. Stochastic Processes and their Applications,
13:235–248, 1982.
[246] Aniket Kittur and Robert E. Kraut. Harnessing the wisdom of crowds in Wikipedia:
Quality through coordination. In Proc. CSCW’08: ACM Conference on Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work, 2008.
[247] Jon Kleinberg. Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. Journal of the
ACM, 46(5):604–632, 1999. A preliminary version appears in the Proceedings of the
9th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, Jan. 1998.
[248] Jon Kleinberg. Navigation in a small world. Nature, 406:845, 2000.
[249] Jon Kleinberg. The small-world phenomenon: an algorithmic perspective. In Proc.
32nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 163–170, 2000.
[250] Jon Kleinberg. Small-world phenomena and the dynamics of information. In Proc.
14th Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 431–438, 2001.
[251] Jon Kleinberg. The wireless epidemic. Nature (News & Views), 449:287–288, 2007.
[252] Jon Kleinberg, Siddharth Suri, ´ Eva Tardos, and Tom Wexler. Strategic network for-
mation with structural holes. In Proc. 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce,
2008.
[253] Jon Kleinberg and ´ Eva Tardos. Algorithm Design. Addison Wesley, 2006.
[254] Jon Kleinberg and ´ Eva Tardos. Balanced outcomes in social exchange networks. In
Proc. 40th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2008.
[255] Judith Kleinfeld. Could it be a big world after all? The ‘six degrees of separation’
myth. Society, 39(2):61–66, January 2002.
[256] Paul Klemperer. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton University Press, 2004.
On-line at www.paulklemperer.org.
[257] Charles Korte and Stanley Milgram. Acquaintance networks between racial groups:
Application of the small world method. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
15, 1978.808 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[258] Gueorgi Kossinets, Jon Kleinberg, and Duncan Watts. The structure of information
pathways in a social communication network. In Proc. 14th ACM SIGKDD Interna-
tional Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, 2008.
[259] Gueorgi Kossinets and Duncan Watts. Empirical analysis of an evolving social network.
Science, 311:88–90, 2006.
[260] Dexter Kozen. The Design and Analysis of Algorithms. Springer, 1990.
[261] Rachel Kranton and Deborah Minehart. A theory of buyer-seller networks. American
Economic Review, 91(3):485–508, June 2001.
[262] Lothar Krempel and Thomas Pl¨ umper. Exploring the dynamics of international trade
by combining the comparative advantages of multivariate statistics and network visu-
alizations. Journal of Social Structure, 4(1), 2003.
[263] David Kreps. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press, 1990.
[264] Ravi Kumar, Jasmine Novak, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Andrew Tomkins. Structure
and evolution of blogspace. Communications of the ACM, 47(12):35–39, 2004.
[265] Ravi Kumar, Prabhakar Raghavan, Sridhar Rajagopalan, D. Sivakumar, Andrew
Tomkins, and Eli Upfal. Stochastic models for the web graph. In Proc. 41st IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pages 57–65, 2000.
[266] J´ erˆ ome Kunegis, Andreas Lommatzsch, and Christian Bauckhage. The Slashdot Zoo:
Mining a social network with negative edges. In Proc. 18th International World Wide
Web Conference, pages 741–750, 2009.
[267] Marcelo Kuperman and Guillermo Abramson. Small world e ect in an epidemiological
model. Physical Review Letters, 86(13):2909–2912, March 2001.
[268] Amy N. Langville and Carl D. Meyer. Google’s PageRank and Beyond: The Science
of Search Engine Rankings. Princeton University Press, 2006.
[269] Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton. Friendship as a social process: A substantive
and methodological analysis. In Morroe Berger, Theodore Abel, and Charles H. Page,
editors, Freedom and Control in Modern Society, pages 18–66. Van Nostrand, 1954.
[270] Herman B. Leonard. Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals
to positions. Journal of Political Economy, 91(3):461–479, 1983.
[271] Jure Leskovec, Lada Adamic, and Bernardo Huberman. The dynamics of viral mar-
keting. ACM Transactions on the Web, 1(1), May 2007.BIBLIOGRAPHY 809
[272] Jure Leskovec, Lars Backstrom, Ravi Kumar, and Andrew Tomkins. Microscopic
evolution of social networks. In Proc. 14th ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 462–470, 2008.
[273] Jure Leskovec and Eric Horvitz. Worldwide buzz: Planetary-scale views on an instant-
messaging network. In Proc. 17th International World Wide Web Conference, 2008.
[274] Jure Leskovec, Dan Huttenlocher, and Jon Kleinberg. Signed networks in social media.
In Proc. 28th ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2010.
[275] Jure Leskovec, Kevin J. Lang, Anirban Dasgupta, and Michael W. Mahoney. Statistical
properties of community structure in large social and information networks. In Proc.
17th International World Wide Web Conference, pages 695–704, 2008.
[276] David Lewis. Convention: A Philosophical Study. Oxford University Press, 1969.
[277] David Liben-Nowell, Jasmine Novak, Ravi Kumar, Prabhakar Raghavan, and An-
drew Tomkins. Geographic routing in social networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA,
102(33):11623–11628, August 2005.
[278] Thomas Liggett. Stochastic Interacting Systems: Contact, Voter and Exclusion Pro-
cesses. Springer, 1999.
[279] Nan Lin. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2002.
[280] L´ aszl´ o Lov´ asz and Michael Plummer. Matching Theory. North-Holland, 1986.
[281] Je rey W. Lucas, C. Wesley Younts, Michael J. Lovaglia, and Barry Markovsky. Lines
of power in exchange networks. Social Forces, 80(11):185–214, 2001.
[282] Sean Luke. Schelling segregation applet. http://www.cs.gmu.edu/ eclab/projects/mason/projects/schelling/.
[283] Je rey K. MacKie-Mason and John Metzler. Links between markets and aftermarkets:
Kodak (1997). In John E. Kwoka and Lawrence J. White, editors, The Antitrust
Revolution, pages 558–583. Oxford University Press, ﬁfth edition, 2004.
[284] Benoit B. Mandelbrot. An informational theory of the statistical structure of languages.
In W. Jackson, editor, Communication Theory, pages 486–502. Butterworth, 1953.
[285] M. Lynne Markus. Toward a “critical mass” theory of interactive media: Universal
access, interdependence and di usion. Communication Research, 14(5):491–511, 1987.810 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[286] Cameron Marlow, Lee Byron, Tom Lento, and Itamar Rosenn. Maintained relation-
ships on Facebook, 2009. On-line at http://overstated.net/2009/03/09/maintained-
relationships-on-facebook.
[287] Seth A. Marvel, Steven H. Strogatz, and Jon M. Kleinberg. The energy landscape of
social balance. Physical Review Letters, 103(19):198701, 2009.
[288] Andreu Mas-Collel, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green. Microeconomic Theory. Ox-
ford University Press, 1995.
[289] Michael Maschler. The bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus. In Robert J. Aumman and
Sergiu Hart, editors, Handbook of Game Theory, volume 1, pages 592–667. Elsevier,
1992.
[290] Doug McAdam. Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of Freedom Summer.
American Journal of Sociology, 92:64–90, 1986.
[291] Doug McAdam. Freedom Summer. Oxford University Press, 1988.
[292] Preston McAfee and John McMillan. Auctions and bidding. Journal of Economic
Literature, 25:708—7470, 1987.
[293] Colin McEvedy. The bubonic plague. Scientiﬁc American, 258(2):118–123, February
1988.
[294] Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. Birds of a feather: Ho-
mophily in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 27:415–444, 2001.
[295] Lauren Ancel Meyers, Babak Pourbohloul, Mark E. J. Newman, Danuta M. Skowron-
ski, and Robert C. Brunham. Network theory and SARS: Predicting outbreak diversity.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 232:71–81, 2005.
[296] Donna Miles. Bush outlines strategy for victory in terror war. American Forces Press
Service, 6 October 2005.
[297] Stanley Milgram. The small-world problem. Psychology Today, 2:60–67, 1967.
[298] Stanley Milgram, Leonard Bickman, and Lawrence Berkowitz. Note on the draw-
ing power of crowds of di erent size. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
13(2):79–82, October 1969.
[299] Paul Milgrom and Nancy Stokey. Information, trade and common knowledge. Journal
of Economic Theory, 26:17–27, 1982.BIBLIOGRAPHY 811
[300] Michael Mitzenmacher. A brief history of generative models for power law and lognor-
mal distributions. Internet Mathematics, 1(2):226–251, 2004.
[301] Mark S. Mizruchi. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of
research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology, 22:271–298, 1996.
[302] Markus M. M¨ obius and Tanya S. Rosenblat. The process of ghetto formation: Evidence
from Chicago, 2001. Working paper.
[303] Dov Monderer and Lloyd S. Shapley. Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior,
14:124–143, 1996.
[304] James Moody. Race, school integration, and friendship segregation in america. Amer-
ican Journal of Sociology, 107(3):679–716, November 2001.
[305] James Moody. The importance of relationship timing for di usion. Social Forces,
81:25–56, 2002.
[306] Michael Moore. An international application of Heider’s balance theory. European
Journal of Social Psychology, 8:401–405, 1978.
[307] Martina Morris and Mirjam Kretzschmar. Concurrent partnerships and the spread of
HIV. AIDS, 11(4):641–648, 1997.
[308] Stephen Morris. Contagion. Review of Economic Studies, 67:57–78, 2000.
[309] Elchanan Mossel and Sebastien Roch. On the submodularity of inﬂuence in social
networks. In Proc. 39th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2007.
[310] Roger Myerson. Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica,
47:61–73, 1979.
[311] Roger Myerson. Optimal auction design. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58–73,
1981.
[312] John Nash. The bargaining problem. Econometrica, 18:155–162, 1950.
[313] John Nash. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 36:48–
49, 1950.
[314] John Nash. Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54:286–295, 1951.
[315] National Research Council Committee on Technical and Privacy Dimensions of In-
formation for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals. Protecting Individual
Privacy in the Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework for Program Assessment.
National Academies Press, 2008.812 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[316] Ted Nelson. Literary Machines. Mindful Press, 1981.
[317] Mark E. J. Newman. Scientiﬁc collaboration networks: II. Shortest paths, weighted
networks, and centrality. Physical Review E, 64:016132, 2001.
[318] Mark E. J. Newman. The structure of scientiﬁc collaboration networks. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA, 98(2):404–409, January 2001.
[319] Mark E. J. Newman. Mixing patterns in networks. Physical Review E, 67:026126,
2003.
[320] Mark E. J. Newman. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM Review,
45:167–256, 2003.
[321] Mark E. J. Newman. Fast algorithm for detecting community structure in networks.
Physical Review E, 69:066133, 2004.
[322] Mark E. J. Newman and Michelle Girvan. Finding and evaluating community structure
in networks. Physical Review E, 69(2):026113, 2004.
[323] Mark E. J. Newman, Duncan J. Watts, and Steven H. Strogatz. Random graph models
of social networks. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 99(Suppl.1):2566–2572, February 2002.
[324] Jakob Nielsen. The art of navigating through hypertext. Communications of the ACM,
33(3):296–310, 1990.
[325] Magnus Nordborg. Coalescent theory. In David J. Balding, Martin Bishop, and Chris
Canning, editors, Handbook of Statistical Genetics, pages 179–212. John Wiley & Sons,
2001.
[326] Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund. Phage-lift for game theory. Nature, 398:367–368,
April 1999.
[327] Martin A. Nowak and Karl Sigmund. Evolutionary dynamics of biological games.
Science, 303:793–799, February 2004.
[328] Barack Obama. Inaugural address, 20 January 2009.
[329] Prize Committee of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sci-
ences. Mechanism design theory, 15 October 2007. On-line at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/economics/laureates/2007/sci.html.
[330] Hubert J. O’Gorman. The discovery of pluralistic ignorance: An ironic lesson. Journal
of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 22:333–347, 1986.BIBLIOGRAPHY 813
[331] Hubert J. O’Gorman and Stephen L. Garry. Pluralistic ignorance — A replication and
extension. Public Opinion Quarterly, 40:449–458, 1976.
[332] Maureen O’Hara. Market Microstructure Theory. Wiley, 1998.
[333] Steve Olson. Mapping Human History: Genes, Race, and our Common Origins.
Houghton Mi in, 2002.
[334] J.-P. Onnela, J. Saramaki, J. Hyvonen, G. Szabo, D. Lazer, K. Kaski, J. Kertesz, and
A.-L. Barabasi. Structure and tie strengths in mobile communication networks. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 104:7332–7336, 2007.
[335] Tim O’Reilly. What is Web 2.0: Design patterns and business models for the next
generation of software. Communication and Strategy, 1:17, 2007.
[336] Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. The MIT Press,
1994.
[337] I. Palacios-Huerta. Professionals play minimax. Review of Economic Studies, 70:395–
415, 2003.
[338] Christopher R. Palmer, Phillip B. Gibbons, and Christos Faloutsos. ANF: A fast and
scalable tool for data mining in massive graphs. In Proc. 8th ACM SIGKDD Interna-
tional Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 81–90, 2002.
[339] David S. Patel. Ayatollahs on the Pareto frontier: The institutional basis of religious
authority in Iraq, 2006. Working paper.
[340] David M. Pennock, Gary W. Flake, Steve Lawrence, Eric J. Glover, and C. Lee Giles.
Winners don’t take all: Characterizing the competition for links on the web. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 99(8):5207–5211, April 2002.
[341] Gabriel Pinski and Francis Narin. Citation inﬂuence for journal aggregates of scien-
tiﬁc publications: Theory, with application to the literature of physics. Information
Processing and Management, 12:297–312, 1976.
[342] Alejandro Portes. Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology.
Annual Review of Sociology, 24:1–24, 1998.
[343] William Poundstone. Prisoner’s Dilemma. Doubleday, 1992.
[344] Robert D. Putnam. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Commu-
nity. Simon & Schuster, 2000.814 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[345] Roy Radner. Rational expectations equilibrium: Generic existence and the information
revealed by prices. Econometrica, 47:655–678, 1979.
[346] Anatol Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah. Prisoner’s Dilemma. University of Michi-
gan Press, 1965.
[347] Anatole Rapoport. Spread of information through a population with socio-structural
bias I: Assumption of transitivity. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 15(4):523–533,
December 1953.
[348] Matt Richardson and Pedro Domingos. Mining knowledge-sharing sites for viral mar-
keting. In Proc. 8th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery
and Data Mining, pages 61–70, 2002.
[349] Sharon C. Rochford. Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment
market. Journal of Economic Theory, 34:262–281, 1984.
[350] John E. Roemer. Political Competition: Theory and Applications. Harvard University
Press, 2001.
[351] Everett Rogers. Di usion of Innovations. Free Press, fourth edition, 1995.
[352] Tim Roughgarden. Selﬁsh Routing and the Price of Anarchy. MIT Press, 2005.
[353] Tim Roughgarden and ´ Eva Tardos. How bad is selﬁsh routing? Journal of the ACM,
49(2):236–259, 2002.
[354] Francois Rousset. Inferences from spatial population genetics. In David J. Balding,
Martin Bishop, and Chris Canning, editors, Handbook of Statistical Genetics, pages
239–270. John Wiley & Sons, 2001.
[355] Matthew C. Rousu. A football play-calling experiment to illustrate the mixed strat-
egy Nash equilibrium. Journal of the Academy of Business Education, pages 79–89,
Summer 2008.
[356] Ariel Rubinstein. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica, 50:97–109,
1982.
[357] Paat Rusmevichientong and David P. Williamson. An adaptive algorithm for selecting
proﬁtable keywords for search-based advertising services. In Proc. 7th ACM Conference
on Electronic Commerce, pages 260–269, 2006.
[358] Bryce Ryan and Neal C. Gross. The di usion of hybrid seed corn in two Iowa commu-
nities. Rural Sociology, 8:15–24, 1943.BIBLIOGRAPHY 815
[359] Matthew Salganik, Peter Dodds, and Duncan Watts. Experimental study of inequality
and unpredictability in an artiﬁcial cultural market. Science, 311:854–856, 2006.
[360] Gerard Salton and M.J. McGill. Introduction to Modern Information Retrieval.
McGraw-Hill, 1983.
[361] Oskar Sandberg. Neighbor selection and hitting probability in small-world graphs.
Annals of Applied Probability, 18(5):1771–1793, 2008.
[362] Alvaro Sandroni. Do markets favor agents able to make accurate predictions? Econo-
metrica, 68:1303–1342, 2000.
[363] Leonard Savage. The Foundations of Statistics. Wiley, 1954.
[364] Thomas Schelling. The Strategy of Conﬂict. Harvard University Press, 1960.
[365] Thomas Schelling. Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of Mathematical Sociology,
1:143–186, 1972.
[366] Thomas Schelling. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton, 1978.
[367] Bruce Schneier. Drugs: Sports’ prisoner’s dilemma. Wired, 10 August 2006.
[368] Carl Shapiro and Hal Varian. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network
Economy. Harvard Business School Press, 1998.
[369] David A. Siegel. Social networks and collective action. American Journal of Political
Science, 53(1):122–138, 2009.
[370] ¨ Ozg¨ ur Sim¸ sek and David Jensen. Navigating networks by using homophily and degree.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 105(35):12758–12762, September 2008.
[371] Herbert Simon. On a class of skew distribution functions. Biometrika, 42:425–440,
1955.
[372] Simon Singh. Erdos-Bacon numbers. Daily Telegraph, April 2002.
[373] John Skvoretz and David Willer. Exclusion and power: A test of four theories of power
in exchange networks. American Sociological Review, 58:801–818, 1993.
[374] Brian Skyrms. The Stag Hunt and Evolution of Social Structure. Cambridge University
Press, 2003.
[375] John Maynard Smith. On Evolution. Edinburgh University Pres, 1972.816 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[376] John Maynard Smith and G. R. Price. The logic of animal conﬂict. Nature, 246:15–18,
1973.
[377] Thomas A. Smith. The web of law. San Diego Law Review, 44(309), 2007.
[378] Tam´ as Solymosi and Tirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan. An algorithm for ﬁnding the
nucleolus of assignment games. International Journal of Game Theory, 23:119–143,
1994.
[379] Michael Spence. Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87:355–374,
1973.
[380] Olaf Sporns, Dante R. Chialvo, Marcus Kaiser, and Claus Hilgetag. Organization,
development and function of complex brain networks. Trends in Cognitive Science,
8:418–425, 2004.
[381] Mark Steyvers and Joshua B. Tenebaum. The large-scale structure of semantic net-
works: Statistical analyses and a model of semantic growth. Cognitive Science,
29(1):41–78, 2005.
[382] David Strang and Sarah Soule. Di usion in organizations and social movements: From
hybrid corn to poison pills. Annual Review of Sociology, 24:265–290, 1998.
[383] James Surowiecki. The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the
Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations.
Little, Brown, 2004.
[384] Alexander Tabarrok and Lee Spector. Would the Borda Count have avoid the Civil
War? Journal of Theoretical Politics, 11(2):261–288, 1999.
[385] ´ Eva Tardos and Tom Wexler. Network formation games and the potential function
method. In Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, ´ Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani, editors,
Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 487–516. Cambridge University Press, 2007.
[386] Richard H. Thaler. Anomalies: The ultimatum game. Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 2(4):195–206, 1988.
[387] Richard H. Thaler. Anomalies: The winner’s curse. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
2(1):191–202, 1988.
[388] Michael F. Thorpe and Philip M. Duxbury. Rigidity Theory and Applications. Springer,
1999.BIBLIOGRAPHY 817
[389] Shane Thye, Michael Lovaglia, and Barry Markovsky. Responses to social exchange
and social exclusion in networks. Social Forces, 75:1031–1049, 1997.
[390] Shane Thye, David Willer, and Barry Markovsky. From status to power: New models
at the intersection of two theories. Social Forces, 84:1471–1495, 2006.
[391] Je rey Travers and Stanley Milgram. An experimental study of the small world prob-
lem. Sociometry, 32(4):425–443, 1969.
[392] Paul E. Turner and Lin Chao. Prisoner’s Dilemma in an RNA virus. Nature, 398:441–
443, April 1999.
[393] Paul E. Turner and Lin Chao. Escape from Prisoner’s Dilemma in RNA phage  6.
American Naturalist, 161(3):497–505, March 2003.
[394] U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Clean air markets.
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/.
[395] Brian Uzzi. The sources and consequences of embeddedness for economic performance
of organizations: The network e ect. American Sociological Review, 61(4):674–698,
August 1996.
[396] Thomas Valente. Evaluating Health Promotion Programs. Oxford University Press,
2002.
[397] Marcel van Assen. Essays on actor models in exchange networks and social dilemmas,
2001. Ph.D. Thesis, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen.
[398] Hal Varian. Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. Norton, 2003.
[399] Hal Varian. Position auctions. International Journal of Industrial Organization,
25:1163–1178, 2007.
[400] William Vickrey. Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. Jour-
nal of Finance, 16:8–37, 1961.
[401] Dejan Vinkovi´ c and Alan Kirman. A physical analogue of the Schelling model. Proc.
Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 103(51):19261–19265, 2006.
[402] Luis von Ahn and Laura Dabbish. Designing games with a purpose. Communications
of the ACM, 51(8):58–67, 2008.
[403] Luis von Ahn, Ben Maurer, Colin McMillen, David Abraham, and Manuel Blum.
reCAPTCHA: Human-based character recognition via Web security measures. Science,
321(5895):1465–1468, September 2008.818 BIBLIOGRAPHY
[404] Jakob Voss. Measuring Wikipedia. In International Conference of the International
Society for Scientometrics and Informetrics, 2005.
[405] Mark Walker and John Wooders. Minimax play at Wimbledon. American Economic
Review, 91:1521–1538, 2001.
[406] Charlotte H. Watts and Robert M. May. The inﬂuence of concurrent partnerships on
the dyanmics of HIV/AIDS. Mathematical Biosciences, 108:89–104, 1992.
[407] Duncan J. Watts. Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and
Randomness. Princeton University Press, 1999.
[408] Duncan J. Watts. A simple model of global cascades on random networks. Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA, 99(9):5766–5771, April 2002.
[409] Duncan J. Watts and Peter S. Dodds. Networks, inﬂuence, and public opinion forma-
tion. Journal of Consumer Research, 34(4):441–458, 2007.
[410] Duncan J. Watts, Peter S. Dodds, and Mark E. J. Newman. Identity and search in
social networks. Science, 296(5571):1302–1305, May 2002.
[411] Duncan J. Watts and Steven H. Strogatz. Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ net-
works. Nature, 393:440–442, 1998.
[412] Ivo Welch. Sequential sales, learning and cascades. Journal of Finance, 47:695–732,
1992.
[413] Barry Wellman. An electronic group is virtually a social network. In Sara Kiesler,
editor, Culture of the Internet, pages 179–205. Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997.
[414] Barry Wellman, Janet Sala , Dimitrina Dimitrova, Laura Garton, Milena Gulia, and
Caroline Haythornthwaite. Computer networks as social networks: Collaborative work,
telework, and virtual community. Annual Review of Sociology, 22:213–238, 1996.
[415] Michael D. Whinston. Tying, foreclosure, and exclusion. American Economic Review,
80(4):837–859, September 1990.
[416] Harrison C. White. Search parameters for the small world problem. Social Forces,
49(2):259–264, December 1970.
[417] David Willer (editor). Network Exchange Theory. Praeger, 1999.
[418] Carsten Wiuf and Jotun Hein. On the number of ancestors to a DNA sequence.
Genetics, 147:1459–1468, 1997.BIBLIOGRAPHY 819
[419] B. Wotal, H. Green, D. Williams, and N. Contractor. WoW!: The dynamics of knowl-
edge networks in massively multiplayer online role playing games (MMORPG). In
Sunbelt XXVI: International Sunbelt Social Network Conference, 2006.
[420] H. Peyton Young. Individual Strategy and Social Structure: An Evolutionary Theory
of Institutions. Princeton University Press, 1998.
[421] Wayne Zachary. An information ﬂow model for conﬂict and ﬁssion in small groups.
Journal of Anthropological Research, 33(4):452–473, 1977.
[422] Alice X. Zheng, Andrew Y. Ng, and Michael I. Jordan. Stable algorithms for link
analysis. In Proc. 24th ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in
Information Retrieval, pages 258–266, 2001.
[423] George Kingsley Zipf. Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least E ort: An Intro-
duction to Human Ecology. Addison Wesley, 1949.